Strategic Use of Uncertainty
Conducted as a sub-project of Climate Information and Water Resource Management in Ceará, Brazil
Location: Columbia University (USA)
Principal Investigators:
Kenneth Broad, Alexander Pfaff
Researchers:
Miguel Fonseca
Project Type: Lab
Funding:
National Science Foundation (NSF SES 0345840)

Goal
The purpose of our study is to understand the group dynamics that exist in the WAC as a function of the set of institutional rules, the role of social distance and the role information about others' outcomes play in shaping equity concerns. The objective of this study is twofold. Firstly, we wish to ascertain the impact of the different institutional features - both formal and informal of the Water Allocation Seminars. Within that we wish to understand both the role of pre-meeting caucusing among members and the role of the strategic uncertainty induced by the plurality vote as a default option in case of negotiation breakdown. We are interested as to how these two features interact. Secondly, we wish to understand the role knowledge of other's payoffs and social distance as catalysts of fairness considerations.
Background
The Water Allocation Committees (WAC) in Ceará, Brazil have successfully worked as conflict resolution institutions as well as a medium through which the local water users have been able to voice their concerns and achieve a more equitable distribution of water. The near future holds the up-scaling of this mechanism to encompass the water management of the basin as a whole. Presently, there is no established institution that will fulfill this role. It is plausible to assume that the Brazilian authorities would look to the WAC in order to model a future basin-level Water Integration Committee (WIC). A potential WIC would be however far larger and more diverse with weaker social ties among participants than the current WAC. Consequently, the level of knowledge about the impact on others of the decisions of a WIC would be far smaller than in the present framework.
The current setup of the WAC is as follows. An expert from the local agency for water management (COGERH) presents a set of release scenarios for each reservoir based on the rainfall forecasts for the next season, as well as the current level of the reservoir. Groups of representatives for the water users of each reservoir then gather and discuss the different release levels until a consensus is reached. If no consensus is reached within the allocated time for debate, a plurality vote is taken. The decision coming out of this vote is binding. An informal feature of the WAC is that a substantial amount of pre-meeting caucusing is done among key reservoir stakeholders in order to avoid the possibility of a vote.
Research Questions
Does strategic uncertainty regarding the outcome of the outside option leads to more equitable outcomes?
Do pre-meeting negotiations lead to coalition formation and therefore reduce the impact of the uncertain outside option?
Does knowledge of others' payoffs leads to more equitable outcomes?
Do increases in social distance lead to less equitable outcomes?
Last Updated: June 1, 2006
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