Surveillance and Control of Rift Valley Fever in the Greater Horn of Africa and the Middle East

Location: Africa, Middle East

Principal Investigators:
David Krantz, IRI staff

Project Type: Field

Funding:
National Science Foundation (NSF SES 0345840)


Goal
CRED in collaboration with the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) is developing a prototype Rift Valley Fever (RVF) risk model. Such a model, if accurate and used effectively, will reduce the multitude of costs associated with RVF. Simulated operational use of the model will lead to guidelines for its effective use. Currently, RVF is a sensitive issue and data are not shared among countries or stakeholders. Developing a valid risk model will involve pooling of data. This is an opportunity to enhance openness and confidence among stakeholders through an intervention in a large-scale multilevel decision system.

The aim of the project is to identify areas that are RVF enzootic with epizootic potential and determine the lead time in which high risk areas and periods can be identified. The goal is to understand the linkages between model outputs and decision-making options at multiple levels. The first step is to understand how pastoralists could be motivated to report the presence of RVF in their area. Barriers to group cooperation must be identified, understood, and addressed in development of the system if cooperation is important.

Background
Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease affecting livestock and humans. It is seen most often during periods of high rainfall during which mosquitoes breed. Progress in climate prediction has produced forecasts of unusually high or low rainfall in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) during the October-December rainy season when many RVF outbreaks have occurred. RVF has had devastating economic consequences in the GHA where sheep and goats have been boycotted by countries in the Arabian Peninsula since 2000. At present, pastoralists have a disincentive to report signs of RVF because doing so could get them blacklisted. Their cooperation is key to success of such a system.

Research Questions
What factors make people more or less likely to deceive (or to disclose information)?

Does the cost of revealing private information differ between individuals and groups?

What constitutes a group? Does it matter whether the group is heterogeneous or homogeneous?

How does culture interact with social and economic goals and incentive structures?

Related Projects
Following is a sub-project conducted as part of the Rift Valley Fever project.

» Effective Use of Scientific Information: Social Goals, Incentive Structures, and Learning Under Uncertainty


Last Updated: June 1, 2006