Research Projects: Lab Projects

• Lab Project 1 - Mental Representation and Framing in Individual and Group Decisions
  (Full description: doc, pdf)
  (David Krantz, Paul Slovic, Elke Weber; 2004-2007)

  A series of experiments will examine four types of representation or framing effect in individual climate-related decisions: (i) reference point effects (gain vs. loss framing, by comparing outcomes to lower or higher reference points; regret framing, with referent of what might have happened, had a different plan been chosen); (ii) status-quo or default effects (where outcomes to be expected in the case of no decision are varied); (iii) time horizon effects (where horizon of decision, or occurrence of outcomes are varied over time); (iv) budget effects (where the costs of actions are posted to different physical or mental accounts). In a typical reference point study, respondents get a description about a climate-related health problem, where the outcomes of different actions can equivalently be described as the number of lives saved (gains) or the number of lives lost (losses). Typically, respondents who see the gain description are more risk-averse than respondents who see the loss description. (People are attracted by small, sure gains and try to avoid sure losses.) We will compare the magnitude the framing effect obtained for individual and for four-person laboratory group decisions. Similar experiments will be carried out for all four types of framing. Instructional modules will be prepared that encourages people to think about hypothetical variants of a decision problem, e.g., to change loss frames to gain, and gain frames to loss, so that any one problem is actually considered in both frames before adopting a plan. We will test the effect of each module on individual decisions, and also on groups, varying the number of group members exposed to the module. Different instructional modules will be relevant to reduce different framing effect. We will also present respondents with some "neutral" scenario descriptions and examine the framing and representation that they spontaneous impose on those decisions (by content analyses of their problem descriptions, collected in web-based experiments, designed to reach a broad cross-section of respondents that differ in nationality, age, and socio-economic status).

• Lab Project 2 - Experience-Based vs. Description-Based Climate-Related Decisions made by Individuals and Groups
  (Full description: doc, pdf)
  (Paul Slovic, Elke Weber; 2005-2008)

  Individuals choose differently when information about frequencies of different events is described in static fashion (e.g., a histogram showing past returns of an investment instrument) than when they personally experience the event by repeated sampling over time. Especially in situations that involve rare events, people tend to be risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses for description-based decisions, but show the opposite pattern for experience-based choice (Hertwig et al 2002). In climate related decisions rare events are often the focus of attention; thus results obtained in gambling studies should be replicated under climate uncertainty. The experience-based paradigm also needs to be broadened to accommodate other empirical observations related to memory of personally experienced climate variables and their effect on decisions. Weber (1997) found that Midwestern farmers' memory about temperatures in previous years showed systematic distortions consistent with their beliefs about climate change. Pilot work in Argentina has shown that farmers systematically misremembered rainfall in recent years consistent with their perceived utility of the agronomic and economic value of more or less rain, i.e., showed evidence of wishful thinking or "wishful memory." Finally, given that the accumulation of information about possible event outcomes and their relative likelihood can either be done by a single individual over time or by a group of individuals who aggregate and pool their individual experiences, the distinction between acquiring information about uncertain outcomes by personal experience or by being told and the effect of differences on this variable need to be tested in a group context.

  Climate-related decision scenarios will be developed with a realistic level of detail on multiple variables (e.g., planting decisions on a farm that are affected by a range of variables, including climate conditions). Decisions need to be made repeatedly across a number of years, and outcome information about uncertain variables (e.g., fertilizer and crop prices, precipitation, temperature, extreme events) are provided each year. The probability distribution of uncertain variables will be varied across respondents, and decisions over time will be collected. After n years of simulation, the exercise will end and respondents will be asked about their explicit recollections of outcomes and their likelihood of uncertain decision variables and about their choice between two courses of action (designed to allow us to infer their implicit assessment of the likelihood a key climate rare events). Decisions will be made either with only statistical descriptions of uncertainties, or with the help of affective/experiential processing with the help of envisioning tools. The simulation will either be taken by a single individual, by a group of individuals doing it in parallel and being allowed to share information, or by an individual and his technical advisor. In addition to observing choices and probability judgments, we will measure both individual decision maker and group member affect. We predict greater affect positive and negative affective reaction for the experiential condition, and predict that these differences in affect will mediate differences in decisions.

• Lab Project 3 - Strategic Orientation in Individual and Group Decisions
  (Full description: doc, pdf)
  (Tory Higgins, John Levine, David Krantz, Elke Weber; 2006-2009)

  A classic issue in social psychology is how group decisions involving risk differ from individuals making the same decision alone. Group polarization describes the fact that groups will arrive at a more extreme risk attitude than the average pre-deliberation risk attitude of individual group members, i.e., can be more risk-seeking or more conservative. We propose that one important factor determining the extent of polarization in group decisions is the regulatory fit between the decision making orientation of the members of the group and the cultural norm about the correct risk attitude for the decision-whether one ought to be normatively risk-taking (e.g., considering alternative job offers early in one's career) or normatively conservative (e.g., considering alternative retirement options).

  Regulatory fit occurs when the norm for a decision sustains (rather than disrupts) the regulatory orientation of a person or group (Higgins, 2000). Persons and groups can make decisions with a promotion focus orientation toward advancement and accomplishment or a prevention focus orientation toward security and responsibility (Higgins 1997). Making a decision in a risky or eager manner (i.e., ensuring against errors of omission) sustains or fits a promotion focus, and making a decision in a conservative or vigilant manner (i.e., ensuring against errors of commission) fits a prevention focus. Both individuals and groups prefer risky choices when in a promotion focus and conservative choices when in a prevention focus (Levine et al 2000). Research in this project will examine two hypotheses, among others: (1) Members of a group whose chronic or situationally-induced focus (promotion or prevention) fits the normative manner of the decision to be made (i.e., a normatively risky or conservative decision) will participate more and be more influential in the decision than members whose focus does not fit; and (2) The higher the proportion of group members whose regulatory focus fits the norm about how the decision ought to be made, the more the final decision will polarize toward that norm (i.e., a risky shift or a conservative shift), and the more the group will value both the process and the outcome of their decision.

• Laboratory Project 4 - Group identity, context and social goals
  (David Krantz, Howard Kunreuther, Elke Weber, 2004-2007)

  Social goals are manifest most easily in situations where a person's actions affect other people's welfare. Strategic games provide an excellent laboratory paradigm; with proper controls, social goals can be isolated and modeled effectively (Fehr Rockenbach 2003). An obvious case is Prisoners' Dilemma: if a person cares about the other player's outcomes, the actual nominal payoff matrix is very different from the nominal one.

  Since chronic strength of social goals is hard to measure, we will manipulate this strength in the laboratory in two ways: by instructing people to play particular roles in a rich story context (as in recent unpublished work on interdependent security, by Kunreuther, Onculer and Schade), or by employing a group identity manipulation, either minimal (Tajfel et al 1971), or by forming groups that complete different substantial group tasks (e.g., anagram versus sequence completion tasks). Following the group identity (or control) manipulation, people will play strategic games (e.g., commons dilemma or interdependent security or investment games). Story context of such games will vary (especially, promotion versus prevention -- allowing relations to Lab project 3). Strength of social goals will be indexed by degree of cooperative choice or unrequired distribution of investment proceeds.

  In this series of experiments, we seek to determine the contributions of group identity, context, and regulatory focus to social goals. On the side, we hope to learn about factors that affect group identity strength (many such can be manipulated) and about the feasibility of direct measurements of chronic social motivation.